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PREFACE 
This study is intended to provide an in-depth account of the con-
stitutional questions debated during the controversy over Jay's Treaty 
in 1795-1796. The primary objective is to show the significance of 
this aspect of the struggle over the treaty. The author feels that 
previous discussions on this formative event in the development of the 
American party system have tended to overlook the vital role of this 
split over constitutional interpretation that was involved. The general 
feeling shared by Federalists and Republicans that the other side were 
"anarchists" and "monarchists" was greatly enhanced during this debate 
when each thought that the other sought the destruction of the Consti-
tution.· From•this, the a.uthor would make a further conjecture that this 
event, by the polarization resulting from its bitter atmosphere, tended 
to have a stagnating effect on the operation of a mature two-party sys-
tem. Finally, it will hopefully be shown here that the Federalists 
considered themselves to be as much "republicans" as the Jeffersonian 
Republicans. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his major adviser, 
Dr. H. James Henderson, for his guidance and assistance throughout this 
study. Special thanks is given to Dr. Douglas Hale for his valuable as-
sistance in proofreading the manuscript. Appreciation is also extended 
to Dr. James Smallwood for his effort in critiquing this study. Fin-
ally, a special thanks goes to my parents, without whose moral and fi-
nancial support, this work would not have been possible. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 7, 1796, Representative Edward Livingston of New York 
introduced the following resolution before Congress: 
Resolved, That the President of the United States be re-
quested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions 
to the Minister of the United States, who negotiated the 
Treaty with the King of Great Britain, communicated by his 
Message of the first of March, together with the corres-
pondence and other documents relative to the said Treaty. 1 
The resolution referred to the treaty negotiated by John Jay with the 
British, a treaty which was regarded by the more avid opponents of the 
Washington administration as a betrayal of American national honor by 
an o~erbearing President acting 1n partnership with a corrupt Senate. 
More, it was seen as an attempt to establish a despotic regime in 
America. For the next two months one of the most heated battles in 
American Congressional history occurred, containing intense debates 
over the powers of the President and the House of Representatives as 
they stood opposed on the prerogative of treaty-making. While the con-
troversy over Jay's Treaty has been pveviously cited as the formative 
event in the development of the American party system, the significance 
of this conflict over the powers of the opposing brancl:J.es of the federal 
government has never been fully acknowledged. Differences over the 
constitutional questions raised by Jay's Treaty have been mentioned as 
playing a role in this rift, but the division over foreign relations 
created by the treaty has previously been considered as the 
1 
2 
determining factor. However, an examination of the debates in Congress 
over Jay's Treaty reveal that even more at issue was the definition of 
the power·s of the President and the Congress as they stood opposed to 
each other on the creation and adoption of treaties in general. 
In an article appearing in the William and Mary Quarterly over two 
decades ago, Joseph Charles identified the battle over Jay's Treaty as 
the event which marked the appearance of a mature party system in 
America. Citing its origins in the fight over Hamilton's fiscal poli-
cies during Washington's first administration, this embryonic party 
system, according to Charles, crystallized in the debates over the 
adoption of Jay's Treaty. As proof of his claim, Charles included 
analyses of roll-call votes in Congress which revealed that in 1790, 
only 42 percent of members of the House voted along party lines, while 
in the fight over Jay's Treaty, a total of 93 percent voted according 
to party persuasions. Stating that "the clash of their opposing views 
gave the most powerful stimulus to party division in this country that 
it had yet received, 112 Charles found the source of this polarization in 
conflicting perceptions of the treaty itself. He believed the Republi-
cans motivated by a desire to block passage of a treaty which sacrificed 
American national honor to British tyranny, which they believed would 
lead to the establishment of despotism in America. The Federalists were 
depicted as attempting to avoid at all costs a war with Great Britain 
which they felt would lead to the destruction of the American nation. 3 
Charles's ideas were expanded by William N. Chambers in a book pub-
lished in 1963 entitled Political Parties in a New Nation. Chambers 
portrayed the Republicans as motivated by a sense of mission to defend 
the American republic against British tyranny. Depending upon the 
3 
rallying of public opinion against the Federalists to establish their 
position, the Republicans thereby established a more effective party 
organization at the grass-roots level. According to Chambers, this ac-
counted for the eventual eclipse of the Federalists by the Republi-
4 
cans. 
In 1972 Richard Buel's Securing the Revolution: A Study of Ideology 
in the 1790's appeared. In this book Buel mentioned the significance of 
the constitutional aspect of the struggle over Jay's Treaty in Congress. 
He noted the conflict over the roles of the executive and legislative 
branch in the making of treaties as a facet of the split over the defi-
nition of republicanism in America. Still, he placed primary emphasis 
on the perception of foreign relations implicated in Jay's Treaty as 
the main element in the argument. Buel believed the Federalists were 
acting out of an extreme fear of war with Great Britain, hoping that the 
document would allow the United States to remain in peace long enough 
to build its economy. 
The Republicans, Buel continued, had no fear of war with Great 
Britain. The power of the federal government, along with the rallying 
of public spirit that an attack by Britain would create, would unite 
the American nation into a formidable force which a country that was 
losing a war with France could not defeat. A war with France was per-
ceived as likely to cause a popular revolt. But the real danger was 
not from the public. It was from the administration, which by seeking 
an alignment with the British monarchy appeared to be taking the first 
step toward establishing a similar form of government in America. 
According to Buel, then, both the Federalists and Republica~s were 
"strongly inclined to see the sinister effects of foreign influence in 
4 
those who thought differently."5. By seeking a corrupt alliance with 
Great Britain, Federalists were perceived as "monarchists." . By desiring 
to be aligned with revolutionary France, Republicans were regarded by 
their opponents as "anarchists."6 
Yet there was more behind these charges than attitudes toward 
foreign policy. The Federalists regarded the Republicans as anarchists 
also for attempting what they saw as an usurpation of the treaty-making 
powers of the President by the House of Representatives. The Republi-
cans, likewise, viewed the Federalists as "monarchists" for apparently 
seeking to allow the President to seize the legislative powers of the 
House through the misuse of his power to make treaties. Thus the fear 
that each side sought the destruction of the American republic was based 
to a considerable extent on a: conflict over the interpretations of the 
power of the President and Congress under the Constitution of the United 
states. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Anna1s of Congress (Washington, D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1855), 4th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1795-1796, p. 426. 
2 Joseph Charles, "The Jay Treaty: The Origins of the American 
Party System," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, XII {1955), p. 
612. 
3rbid., pp. 585, 583, 612-614, 593-594, 600-609. 
4William N. Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: 
Oxford, 1963), pp. 91, 80, 85-86. 
5Richard Buel, Securin of Ideolo 
~~~~--~~~----~~~--~~~----~~-------1790's (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 52 • 
in the 
. 
6rbid., pp. 69-70, 66-68, 70-71. 
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CHAPTER II 
" THE JAY TREATY 
Jay's Treaty was conceived out of a desire to solve two problems 
plaguing the new American nation: continued attacks upon American 
shipping by the British fleet; and matters left unsolved by the Peace 
Treaty of 1783 with the former mother country. Specifically, these 
problems involved the continued occupation of forts in the Northwest 
Territory by the British, debts owed by American citizens to British 
creditors, and compensation to slaveowners who had lost slaves during 
the Revolutionary War by British capture. The immediate event which 
brought the situation to a volatile point was the increasing British 
disregard for American neutral rights at sea following the Orders-in 
Council of June 8, and November 6, 1793. Conductin~ an all-out war 
against revolutionary France, Britain used its control of the seas to 
block American trade with the French. United States' cargoes of food-
stuffs and naval stores bound for France were defined by the Orders-in 
Council as contraband subject to seizure, and were being confiscated 
without compensation by His Majesty's Fleet. If this was not enough 
injury, further insult was supplied by the British resort to the much-
resented practice of impressment of American seamen. 
When the Third Congress convened in January of 1794, members pro-
posed measures to end this harassment. On January 3, James Madison 
introduced a set of resolutions aimed at striking a blow against British 
6 
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commerce in the United states. Calling for higher import duties on the 
products of nations which had no commercial trade treaty with the United 
1 
states, Madison's resolutions signaled the appearance of an organized 
alternative plan to that of the administration. In essense, it marked 
2 the beginning of the American political party system. 
Measures calling for even stronger action subsequently appeared in 
the form of military establishment and naval armament bills throughout 
the next six weeks while Madison's resolutions were vigorously debated. 
Support for military preparation was bolstered by the news of Indian 
uprisings on the western frontier, which were presumably stirred up by 
the British. Separate bills were introduced during the last week of 
March and first week of April calling for a national embargo, seques-
tration of American debts to British creditors, and finally, non-
intercourse with Great Britain as further deprivations of American com-
merce mounted. Although the sequestration measure failed, Congress 
approved and later extended an embargo of one month's duration and also 
. 1 t d . t t d t 't . 3 1mp emen e non-1n ercourse owar Grea Br1 a1n. 
President Washington realized that this action on the part of the 
House suggested the necessity of strong initiatives of his own. For 
one thing, this attempt to extend their power of regulating commerce to 
international relations seemed to constitute an encroachment upon the 
treaty-making power of the President. 4 . It was the conflict over this 
prerogative that formed the nucleus of the ideological debates over the 
constitutionality of Jay's Treaty. House Republicans contended that the 
right of that body to regulate commerce gave it authority to h~1.ve a 
voice in the approval of the treaty, since it contained articles 
relative to American commerce, Washington and the Federalists 
maintained that the power of treaties by necessity superseded that of 
ordinary legislative authority, and that the prerogative of making 
treaties resided in the executive branch of the government alone, sub-
ject to the approval of the Senate only. 
8 
It is interesting to note here that both parties seemed to contra~ 
diet their earlier views concerning construction of the Constitution. 
The Federalists, who had previously utilized a loose construction of 
the Constitution in claiming the existence of broad prerogatives given 
to the federal government, now invoked a strict constructionist pos-
ture in defining exactly the powers of the legislative and executive 
branches. They maintained that the House was attempting to exceed its 
delegated authority by violating the expressed powers of the President. 
The Republicans, who had virtually based their existence on a philoso-
phy of limited government clearly defined by the Constitution, contended 
for a broad interpretation of the powers of the legislative body in as-
serting its prerogative in all matters that touched upon is implied 
powers in any form. This was a point of departure for the Federalists 
and Jeffersonian Republicans from a common source -- a belief in re-
publican government. Differing interpretations of the same ideal led 
them to opposite conclusions. The Federalists considered themselves to 
be republicans as much as the Jeffersonians did. To regard the Jeffer-
sonians as the sole spokesmen of republican philosophy in the United 
States is to accept their side of the argument. Because most people 
did come to accept their view, the Jeffersonian party eventually pre-
vailed.5 
Seeking to maintain the prestige of both his office and his 
country, Washington appointed John Jay as Plenipotentiary Extraordinary 
9 
to Great Britain on April 11, 1794, an appointment that the Senate con-
firmed on April 29. Yet this selection of Jay was not without con-
troversy. Because he was serving as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
at the time, Jay's capacity in this mission was constitutionally sus-
pect. (Article III of the Constitution, which provides for an inde-
pendent judiciary, was believed by some to be violated here.) This 
circumstance later gave weight to charges made by the administration's 
foes that the treaty was the result of a Federalist conspiracy. 
Secretary of State Edmund Randolph drew up instructions for Jay 
on May 6. Containing strong imperatives, Randolph's instructions 
ordered Jay to push uncompromisingly for recognition of American neu-
trality and for evacuation of British forts in the Northwest. The 
Secretary of State believed that the sovereignty of the United States 
had been violated repeatedly, and he could tolerate no more. The pro-
tection of American commerce and compensation for previous violations 
were given primary emphasis. Randolph stipulated that the settlement 
of issues left unsolved by the Treaty of 1783 were not in any way to 
lead to a compromise on American rights at sea: 
Compensation for all the injuries sustained, and captures, 
will be strenuously pressed by you. • • • but you will 
consider the inexecution and infraction of the treaty as 
standing on distinct grounds from the vexations and 
spoliations: so that no adjustment of the former is to 
be influenced by the latter.6 · 
Randolph instructed Jay to consult with the ministers of Russia, 
Denmark, and Sweden in London, on the possibility of the United states 
joining those nations in the Leage of Armed Neutrality if he could not 
secure recognition of American neutrality on his own. Randolph was 
convinced that "The principle of armed neutrality would abundantly 
10 
cover our neutral rights,"7 if all other diplomatic overtures failed. 
Whether or not this threat would have secured American neutral rights 
was never demonstrated, because Jay failed to mention it to the British 
Foreign Secretary with-whom he negotiated. Even if he had, it would 
have had little force because Alexander Hamil ton had previously in-
formed the British through their American ambassador that the United 
States had no real intention of joining the League of Armed Neutrality. 
Samuel Flagg Bemis condemned this action of Hamilton as the main reason 
for the weakness of Jay's Treaty in obtaining American rights. 8 Others, 
such as John c. Miller, stated that such a suggestion on the part of 
Jay in London would have caused the British to send him home. 9 
A commercial trade treaty was suggested as desirable only if neu-
tral rights were secured. Obviously an agreement to cond~ct trade with-
out recognition of its legality was of questionable value. In addition, 
Randolph also stipulated that such a commercial pact between America 
and Britain should contain f·ree trade with reciprocity and the opening 
of the British West Indies to American ships. By admitting that such 
liberal concessions were unlikely to be granted by Great Britain, and 
at the same time maintaining their existence as necessary conditions 
for a commercial pact, Randolph was in essence expressing the unlikeli-
hood of acquiring a trade treaty. Jay was told quite clearly that "if 
a treaty cannot be formed upon a basis as advantageous as this, you are 
10 
not to conduct or sign any ~uch." . In c+osing, Randolph granted Jay 
a certain amount of discretion in following these guidelines, with the 
specific exception that "the Government of the United states will not 
derogate from our treaties and engagements with France. 1111 This con-
dition acquired significance in the following year with the dislosures 
11 
of Randolph's intrigue with a French agent. 
Jay arrived in London on June 8, 1794, and held his first session 
with Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, a few days later. 
Negotiations between the diplomats proceeded smoothly, perhaps because 
Jay retreated considerably from the stern orders which Randolph had 
given him. What remained unproven was whether these objectives could 
have been achieved, as the Republicans thought, with a stronger amount 
of determination on the part of Jay. In a letter to the Secretary of 
State in July, the envoy explained that although Lord Grenville had 
taken a conciliatory tone in conducting negotiations, the British For-
eign Secretary nonetheless remained firm in his position. From this 
situation, Jay concluded no grave concessions could be expected. As he 
saw it, there were simply too many obstacles preventing fulfillment of 
Handolph 1 s instructions. While he was not totally dismissing the pos-
sibility that considerable reconciliation could be achieved, Jay stated 
that he was, nonetheless, "not sanguine in my expectations. nl2 It was 
his opinion that Britain would not yield to the degree required to pro-
vide such satisfaction. The British were not negotiating out of a de-
Slre to serve American national interest; they were doing so in order 
to enhance their own position, just as any country would. 
The treaty formally signed by Jay and Lord Grenville on November 
19, 1794, revealed a considerable amount of yielding on the American 
side. The main point which Randolph intended Jay to bargain for, 
recognition of American neutral rights, was conspicuously missing. No 
guarantee against impressment was mentioned, and Article 18 even went 
so far as to enumerate items that would be considered as contraband and 
subject to British seizure -- in other words, future spoliations were 
12 
provided for! Although idemnification was stipulated, it did not jus-
tify acquiescence to the violation of national honor. Compensation for 
previous spoliations was provided for, but was to be adjudicated by a 
joint commission of both nations. British evacuation of the Northwest 
forts was included, but with a liberal time allotment of eighteen 
months. Even more disturbing than this delay was the retention by the 
British of the rights to continue participation in the fur trade in the 
area and to navigate the Mississippi River. And Americans had to honor 
their prewar debts with British creditors, a matter which would be 
worked out by a joint commission similar to the one settling cases of 
spoliations. 
As compensation for these concessions by the United States, the 
treaty offered a weak commercial agreement. Trade with the British 
West Indies was opened by Article 12 to American ships of seventy tons 
or less ~- a condition meaning that nothing bigger than a fishing boat 
would be allowed to enter -- which in effect rendered it a worthless 
concession. A one-sided trade agreement between the two nations was 
included which gave Britain most favored nation status without re-
ciprocity. (British ships were given free trade rights in American 
ports, while American ships in British ports remained subject to 
duties.) 
A particular stipulation of the trade agreement·which caused con-
I 
siderable resentment in the South was the prohibition against the ex-
port of American cotton. When Eli Whitney's cotton gin appeared right 
after the signing of the treaty, a product which,promised to become a 
staple of the southern economy was greatly hi~dered in its development. 
Another injury to the South was the failure to secure any compensation 
for slaves captured previously by the British. The only advantage on 
the American side of the trade treaty was the opening of the East 
I d . t Am . h' 'th t . t' 13 n 1es o er1can s 1ps w1 no res r1c 1ons. 
Attempting to justify his efforts, Jay wrote approvingly of the 
treaty in a letter to Oliver Ellsworth on November 19: 
• • • In my opinion we have reason to be satisfied. 
• • • Further concessions on the part of Great Britain 
cannot, in my opinion, be attained. The minister 
flatters himself that this treaty will be very ac-
ceptable to our country, and that some of the articles 
in it will be received as unequivocal proofs of good 
win.l4 
13 
Anticipating hostility from Randolph, Jay wrote the Secretary of State 
a letter explaining the treaty point by point, which sounded at times 
almost apolegetic: "The 12th article ••• affords occasion for sev-
15 
eral explatory remarks." 
Randolph indeed became enraged over the terms of the treaty and 
ultimately denounced it and its perpetrators. But his denunciation came 
almost a year later, following the arrival of the treaty in the United 
States, its approval by the Senate, the mass outrage when the terms be-
came known to the public, and Randolph's resignation at Washington's 
request. 
The document arrived in America in March, 1795. Washington waited 
until June to call the Senate into special session to ratify, being un-
impressed by the treaty. Assembling on June 8, the Senate granted rat-
ification on June 24 by a vote of 20-10, the bare margin necessary for 
passage. But even this was not accomplished without the striking of 
Article 12 (the commercial trade agreement which included restricted 
trade with the West Indies and forbade the export of American cotton). 16 
Conducted in closed session, the Senate records contain no lengthy 
14 
ideological debate. It would be left to the House of Representatives 
in the debates of March and April of 1796 to bring forth spirited dis-
cussions on the constitutional questions raised by passage of Jay's 
Treaty. 
On June 30, the terms of the treaty became public, one day prior 
to its official release. Senator stevens Thomson Mason of Virginia, a 
staunch Republican foe of the treaty, had given a copy to the editor of 
the newspaper Aurora which had printed the articles of Jay's Treaty in 
its June 30 edition. Upon discovering the weak position of the United 
States, a considerable proportion of the American population became out~ 
raged at John Jay and his treaty. Anti-treaty demonstrations were held, 
Jay was burned in effigy, and mobs roamed the street chanting "Damn John 
17 Jay! Damn anyone who won't damn John Jay!" The popular conception of 
Jay's Treaty was that it was a Federalist plot to sell out the United 
States to Britain, in order to create a monarchy here. In time, this 
suspicion would lead to the decline and eventual extinction of the 
Federalist party on the national level. 18 
Washington, meanwhile, was still unsure whether the treaty merited 
his signature. He believed that the elimination of Article 12 by the 
Senate perhaps nullified the entire document. Seeking advice, the first 
President conferred with his entire Cabinet, and also with the prominent 
former Cabinet member, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton, whose letters 
written under the name "Camillus" would later provide the best ideolog-
ical defense of Jay's Treaty, gave Washington an unenthusiastic en-
dorsement of the treaty in a reply dated July 9, 1795. A lengthy ex-
position discussing the pros and cons of each article, Hamilton's 
response recommended approval of the treaty on the grounds that it was 
15 
better than its alternative -- war. Left alone in peace, Hamilton be~ 
lieved that the United states could develop its own economy enough to 
assert its national prestige abroad. 19 But stable relations abroad were 
a prerequisite to domestic development. This was the essence of Hamil-
ton's foreign policy, as he had explained some years earlier at the 
Federal Convention: "No Government could give us tranquillity & hap-
piness at home, which did not possess sufficient strength to make us 
20 
respectable abroad." 
Recommendations of approval were also given by all the Cabinet, 
except Edmund Randolph. The Secretary of state denounced the agreement 
as a total sacrifice of American national honor and a submission to 
British tyranny. He suggested scrapping the treaty and undertaking new 
negotiations, yonvinced that the passing of time alone would put the 
United States in a more favorable bargaining position. Randolph ended 
with a prophetic warning: "If this order be tolerated while France 1s 
understood to labour under a famine, the torrent of invective from 
France and our own countrymen will be immense."21 
None of these communiques resolved Washington's dilemma about the 
treaty. As late as July 22, he expressed the opinion that he did not 
feel the treaty secured the proper advantages of the country, but that 
it was better to acquire any agreement rather "than to suffer matters 
to remain as they are, unsettled. 1122 Washington's mind was soon 
cleared of doubt following disclosure of two significant events. First 
was the discovery of the new British Order-in-Council of April 25, 
1795, which amplified the previous Orders of 1793. Suspecting that 
this was a British attempt to urge American ratification of the treaty, 
Washington mistakenly believed that implementation of the treaty would 
16 
suspend operation of the new Order-in-Council. In fact it did not, 
owing to Article 18 which defined contraband and submitted it to seizure 
by the British. 23 The second event prompting Washington's approval was 
the revelation of Edmund Randolph's intrigue with a French agent, 
Fauchet, to influence American officials. Randolph's previous denunci-
ations of the treaty for its injuries to France thus became suspect. 
Washington gave his signature to Jay's Treaty on August 14, 1795. 
On August 18, it was proclaimed the law of the land. The President 
asked Randolph for his resignation and received it on August 19. This 
set the stage for the bitter struggle in Congress the following spring. 
The discussion in Congress on the terms of the treaty centered 
around the perception of how much success it achieved in securing the 
proper advantages by the United States in relation to Great Britain. 
Accordingly, the Federalists saw it as successful in this endeavor, 
while the Republicans viewed it as a dismal failure. Madison opened 
the proceedings with a sharp speech critically analyzing every article. 
He suggested three criteria to serve as guidelines: how it related to 
(1) the Peace Treaty of 1783; (2) the law of nations; and (3) the ad-
vantages rendered to American commerce. He asserted that the treaty 
fell woefully short of measuring up to acceptable standards in all 
three categories. Madison denounced Jay's Treaty as a one-way agreement 
in Britain's favor in each category. For example, no compensation was 
made for slaves captured by the British during the Revolutionary War, 
while Americans were obliged to honor prewar debts to British creditors. 
Madison found the time allotment of eighteen months given the British 
to evacuate forts in the Northwest too liberal. What he found even 
more repugnant was the retention of the right to participate in the fur 
17 
trade by the British in this area, for he suspected this would enable 
them to dominate that trade. In regards to the law of nations, the 
treaty was a total sacrifice of American national honor in a prostration 
to British sovereignty. Madison considered the granting of most fa-
vored nation status to Great Britain without reciprocity a pitifully 
poor bargain, while the surrender of American rights by allowing United 
states cargoes to be seized as contraband embodied a gross violation of 
the law of nations. He denounced the limited trade with the West 
Indies provided by Article 12 as rendering the whole treaty worthless 
by failing to gain the major object for which a commercial agreement 
with Great Britain was desired -- full trade in the West Indies with 
reciprocity. Altogether, the treaty should be rejected, and he saw no 
reason to conclude that this action would result in a war with Great 
Britain, as claimed by the Federalists in a final argument to persuade 
Republicans to approve the treaty. 24 
Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut replied to Madison's denunciation 
of the treaty in a speech which followed the fonn of his opponent's, 
with the exception that the conclusions the Federalists drew from an-
alyzing the document were exactly opposite. Swift contended that the 
provisions of the treaty were adequate when realistically considered 
in their proper contest. Specifically, he pointed out that the Peace 
Treaty of 1783 had promised no compensation for Negroes, while the pay-
ment of debts to British creditors was a legal obligation under that 
treaty. In any event, the matter of debts was balanced by a concession 
in America's favor to surrender the forts in the Northwest. Swift 
ridiculed the assumption that adequate compensation seizures was not 
provided for. He praised the joint commission set up by the treaty to 
18 
BetUc these claims as an honorable body, sure to adjudicate claims in 
an equitable manner. The opening of trade with the East Indies, which 
the Republicans glossed over in their criticisms, was cited as a major 
advantage rendered by Jay's Treaty. Going beyond the contention that 
this privilege offset the disagreeable arrangement with the West Indies, 
Swift questioned the legality of the American claim to unrestricted 
trade with these islands. Article 12 was thus defended as just and 
proper. The failure to secure the right to sequester American debts 
owed to British creditors was no real loss. Knowing that they were 
safe from this threat, British creditors would feel more disposed toward 
extending credit to the United States, a great advantage to this coun-
try. Further, he saw no violation of the law of nations 2n stipulating 
what articles were to be regarded as contraband, contending that na-
tions held the right to determine that between themselves. In conclud-
ing, Swift envisioned terrible calamities (loss of trade, Indian 
uprisings, increased violations of American commerce, and eventual war 
with Britain) that would befall the United States if the treaty were 
rejected. Survival of the republic itself mandated approval of Jay's 
25 Treaty. 
The Federalists would go on to denounce Republican opposition to 
Jay's Treaty for the internal disruption they believed it would cause. 
Indeed, this was stressed more than the international aspect. The Re-
publicans insisted just the opposite: approval of the treaty would 
result in domestic havoc. Many, such as Edmund Randolph, 'thought that 
it would lead to despoti~m in America. 
The former Secretary of state denounced Washington as a tyrant 
attempting to establish a monarchy. In this regard, Randolph was not 
19 
alone. Many saw the President as a corrupt despot who had sold out the 
country. Others saw him merely as the head of the Federalist party, 
working for the advancement of that group at the expense of the na-
tional interest. The emerging leader of the anti-administration forces, 
Thomas Jefferson, expressed his opinion in a letter to James Madison on 
September 21, 1795: 
A bolder party-stroke was never struck. For it certainly 
is an attempt of a party, which finds they have lost their 
majority in one branch of the legislature, to make a law by 
the aid of the other branch & of the executive, under the 
color of a treaty, which shall bind up the hands of the 
adverse branch ··from ever restraining the commerce of their 
patron nation.26 
Madison had previously expressed similar opinions in a dispatch to 
Robert Livingston on August 23, declaring that the whole episode demon-
strated that the Federalists were nothing more than "a British party 
systematically aiming at an exclusive connection with the British gov-
ernment & ready to sacrifice to that object as well the dearest inter-
27 
ests of our commerce as the most sacred dictates National Honour." 
The Federalists were viewed as a group of Anglophiles who wished to 
draw the United States into partnership with Great Britain to restore 
monarchy in America. Opponents of Jay's Treaty also found the concep-
tion and essence of the treaty itself to be unconstitutional. House 
Republicans led the fight against Jay's Treaty as a crusade to protect 
the people's liberties against what they perceived as an effort by the 
Federalists to establish tyranny in America by transferring the powers 
of the House to the President. 
Both the Federalists and the Republicans adopted their respective 
stance toward Jay's Treaty largely from a belief that the opposition 
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would lead to the destruction of the American republic by subverting 
the Constitution. At the base of this divergence lay essentially dif-
fering notions of the concept of republican government. 
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CHAPTER III 
AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM 
American republicanism had its roots in the dissenting English· 
Whig tradition which developed in the seventeenth century in opposition 
to the tyranny of the stuarts. In essence, that philosophy regarded 
political life as a continual struggle between the people and their 
rulers. It was the natural inclination of those in power to seek aug-
mentation of their authority by encroachments upon the rights of the 
people. Therefore the people must always be on guard to protect their 
rights against the tyranny of their rulers. Since this struggle between 
rulers and the ruled was a fact of life, the only way a free society 
could be established was to give power to the people. But even this 
was not enough. The people could become tyrannical themselves through 
the abuse of freedom. Wherever power resided there was danger it would 
be misused. This facet of republican philosophy played an essential 
role in the development and application of republicanism in America. 
Anarchy, the result of unrestrained freedom, was a situation no 
more desirable than the tyranny of a single despot. To ensure the 
preservation of popular government the people had to possess a sense of 
public virtue. Virtue came to be regarded as the cornerstone upon 
which republican government was founded. When virtue ceased to exist, 
republics withered and died. Examples of classical antiquity furnished 
reminders of this fact, the ancient republics of Greece and Rome having 
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<.lccs.tycd hecause they had become corrupt. 
In the eyes of American colonists, l':ngland in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century appeared to be in the same condition. There, 
the growth of wealth had given rise to an elite group which used its 
monetary influence to corrupt the officers of government. This in-
fluence resulted in an arbitrary and capricious administration motivated 
by the consolidation of personal gain. It was as if a conspiracy 
existed to drain the people of their rights by an elite group attempting 
t h "t •t• 1 o en ance 2 s own pos2 2on. 
Convinced that England was so corrupt as to be beyond hope of re-
form, colonists decided that the only recourse left for them was to 
rebel against the mother country. This was not a suddeh impulse, but a 
well-considered plan of action. In a sense, it was justified by the 
notion that it was England that had broken aw~ from the colonies by 
violating the constitution. The colonists believed that "they revolted 
not against the English constitution but on behalf of it."2 
With this legacy, Americans naturally attempted to establish re-
publican government, believing it to be the only desirable kind. 3 The 
Revolutionaries recognized that representation was the very foundation 
of republican government, and that elected representatives must serve 
the interests of the people. In order for the representatives to re-
main guardians of the public liberty a bond of interests had to be 
maintained. Whenever any official became detached from the public 
interest, the people's rights were subject to his personal disposal. 
The machinery of election provided the remedy of republican government 
-- any time a representative betrayed the public trust he could be 
voted out of office. 4 
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This concept of the proper role of the representative antedated 
the Revolution. Indeed, Americans before 1776 increasingly believed 
that elected representatives should be guided by the expressed desires 
of the people themselves. Although some subscribed to Edmund Burke's 
theory of the representative as a trustee, whereby the legislator fol-
lowed the discretion of his own conscience rather than the direction of 
popular opinion, most did not. Whenever the representative removed· 
himself from the desires of the people, the colonists felt that the 
people's interests were betrayed. This conviction was intended when 
the British claimed that Parliament "virtually" represented the colo-
nists. In this context Americans overwhelming rejected the corollary 
of Burke's theory that the representative should act in the interest of 
the nation as a whole rather than merely as an agent of the particular 
constituency that elected him. Colonists insisted that if the delegate 
did not represent his constituency, the people's interests were not 
served. A representative had to be chosen by the people and remain re-
sponsive to their needs and wishes to fulfill his role properly. 5 These 
conflicting theories of representation played a vital role in the de-
velopment of the split between the colonies and the mother country. 
Regarding the directives from London as becoming increasingly hostile 
to their interests, colonists cited the fact that they chose no members 
of Parliament as proof that they were not represented in the British 
government. Thus when Americans broke away from Britain, they were de-
termined to have representatives whom they elected directly and who re-
mained responsive to their will. 6 
This commitment to representation resulted logically from the dis-
trust of the magistrate which had developed under the arbitrary rule of 
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the royal governors. When Americans went about setting up new state 
governments after 1776, the executive branch was either severely 
limited, as in the majority of state constitutions, or nonexistent, as 
in the national government under the Articles of Confederation. In all 
but three states, governors were chosen by the legislature, as were the 
executive councils, which provided a further check on the governors. 
The governor had no control over legislation; the veto was not provided 
for. In effect, the executive became a mere figurehead. The result 
was that the legislature assumed all the practical powers of govern~ 
ment. 7 
In the 1780's, this concentration of power in the legislature 
created its own problems which provided fresh demonstration of the old 
Whig doctrine that danger of tyranny existed from wherever the base of 
power resided. Inexperienced legislators passed ill-conceived laws 
prompting widespread criticism. "The True Republican" in the December 
1, l785, edition of the Boston Independent Chronicle, attributed the 
fall of the ancient cities of Carthage and Athens to the abuses of their 
legislatures. 8 Thomas Jefferson after his term as governor of Virginia 
remarked bitterly that "an elective despotism was not the government we 
fought for." 9. Accordingly, his draft of a new constitution for Virginia 
in 1783 included a strong insistence upon the principle of separation 
of powers, so that one branch would not consolidate all authority in 
itself. 10 James Madison felt that the stalemate of the 1780's in the 
Virginia legislature was due largely to the quabbling over local inter-
ests which dominated the proceedings of that body. In his "Observations 
on Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia," Madison complained 
of legislators who "are everywhere observed to lose sight of the 
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aggregate interests of the community, and even to sacrifice them to the 
interests or prejudices of their respective constituents."ll Thus to 
Madison, it was imperative for the representatives to be guided by a 
stronger discretion in favor of the interests of the community as a 
whole, rather than by the mere dictates of the people who elected them. 
Although drifting toward the "trusteeship" notion of representation, 
Madison was not suggesting that the representatives should ignore the 
interests of the people. Rather, it was by rising above this regional 
particularism that the interests of the people would best be served, 
for "in general, these local interests are miscalculated."12 
Madison made even harsher criticisms of the legislature five years 
later at the Federal Convention: "Experience in all states had evinced 
.a powerful tendency in the legislature to absorb all power in its vor-
tex. This was the real source of danger to the American constitu-
t . 13 1ons." To Madison, the proper remedy which he proposed for the 
federal government was an independent executive and senate with the 
powers necessary to offset the usurping tendencies of the legislature. 
"The most effectual remedy for the local bias is to impress on the minds 
of the senators an attention to the interests of the whole society by 
making them the choice of the whole society. 1114 In "Observations" he 
found even his fellow Virginian's new proposals too lacking in the 
15 powers granted to the executive and the senate. At the Federal Con-
vention, in The Federalist, and at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 
Madison would propose and defend the concept of a powerful executive 
and senate, particularly the latter. He regarded the Senate as outlined 
in the Federal Constitution to be ~ particularly vital element in stab-
ilizing the new government. Seeing its value in providing a check 
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against the abuses of the legislature, Madison stated that irrt doubles 
the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct 
bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or cor-
ruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient. 1116 
While he believed in an executive with stronger authority than 
those which existed in the state constitutions, Madison did not share 
the idea to the extreme that Alexander Hamilton did. At the Federal 
Convention, Hamilton argued in favor of a president for life, feeling 
that such an official would prove to be even more judicious in office 
17 than ·one removed by election. Madison, however, expressed an earnest 
desire to keep the President a limited official. In reply to a proposal 
to grant broad powers to the executive, he countered that "a definition 
of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they 
. ht b f 1 t t d t . 1 ff" 18 m1g e sa e y en rus e o a s1ng e o 1cer." The man known as the 
Father of the Constitution remarked later at th.e Federal Convention "the 
utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the judi,ciary to the Execu-
tive seemed incontestable."19 And in Federalist 51, he dismissed 
criticism of the lack of an absolute presidential veto because "on 
extraordinary occasion, it might be perfidiously abused. 1120 
If Hamilton did not get as powerful an executive as he proposed, 
he seemed at least satisfied with the office the Constitution provided 
for. Hamilton maintained that the President of the United States 
would be as much or more of a guardian of the people's liberties as the 
Congress, since he was chosen by all the people. At the New York Rat-
ifying Convention, he stated that "the President of the United States 
will be himself the representative of the people." Acting in the best 
interest of all the people, the President would "be induced to protect 
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their rights, whenever they are invaded by the other branch. 1121 Besides 
the President, Hamilton saw the Senate as providing a further check on 
the excesses of the direct representatives of the people. Owing to 
their larger constituency and indirect election, the Senate would be 
comprised of trustees who would follow their consciences in deciding 
in favor of the best interests of the people as a whole, rather than 
following the dictates of local prejudices. In the New York Convention, 
Hamilton described his perception of the role of the senator as being 
"an agent for the union, bound to perform services necessary to the good 
of the whole, though his state should condemn them. 1122 
Remaining loyal to the hallowed Whig belief that the threat of 
tyranny existed from wherever the source of power resided, Hamilton 
suggested a remedy for the problem. Yet his remedy, a powerful chief 
executive, raised the specter of magisterial despotism. This paradox 
was rationalized by the Federalists, as Gordon Wood explains: "The 
Federalists, far from seeing themselves as rejecters of populism and 
the faith of 1776, could now intelligibly picture themselves as the 
true defenders of the libertarian tradition."23 
The basis of the Federalist rationale in denying the dangers of a 
powerful national government was that this new American government, un-
like any before, was founded by the people themselves. Any power which 
this government possessed was granted by permission of the ·people. It 
could not do anything which the people did not approve. This was in 
marked contrast to the government of England and elsewhere. There the 
power of government was not in the hands of the people but in the 
rulers. The history of mankind was one of a struggle by the people for 
liberty from their rulers. In the United states, this struggle was 
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eliminated. Here the people formed the base of power. This was the 
source of the Federalist's denial of the necessity of a bill of rights 
to the Federal Constitution. There was no need to deny government 
powers which it did not have, since those not expressly granted to it 
were retained by the people. The only way in which the proposed federal 
government could swallow the liberties of the people was for them to 
grant it the authority to do so. And to the Federalists, this danger 
existed in the form of representatives who would seize upon the popular 
passions to deceive the people into thinking that they were acting in 
the best interests of the public, when in reality they were only serving 
their own personal ends. In an essay entitled '-'Vices of the Political 
System of the United States," Madison expressed a fear of the "unen-
lightened representative ••• , veiling his selfish views under the 
professions of public good, and varnishing his sophistical arguments 
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with the growing colours of popular eloquence." 
The Federal Constitution, then, provided a remedy for this situa-
tion by protecting the people against themselves. Again, Wood de-
scribes it aptly: 
To the Federalists the greatest dangers to republicanism 
were flowing not, as the old Whigs had thought, from the 
rulers or from any distinctive minority in the community, 
but from the widespread participation of the people in 
the government • • They did not see themselves as 
repudiating either the Revolution or popular government, 
but saw themselves as saving both from their excesses.25 
Federalism was conceived in essence to be republicanism. Popular 
government was hereby established on a basis that would guarantee its 
survival. 
Anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution were not persuaded by 
this logic. To them, the Constitution seemed to create a government 
dangerously centralized in the hands of powerful officials. Richard 
Henry Lee attempted to inform his fellow citizens of this danger in the 
"Letters of a Federal Farmer" which explained his reasons for not ac-
cepting the Federal Constitution. Lee, who had been invited to attend 
the Convention and declined the offer, saw the Federalists themselves 
as acting upon the popular feelings of the time to further their own 
ends. To Lee "this very abuse of power in the legislature, ••• has 
furnished aristocratical men with those very means, with which, in 
great measure, they are rapidly effecting their favourite object. 1126 
To the Anti-Federalists, the American people were presented with a 
chance to establish a free society and were here throwing the oppor-
tunity away if the Federal Constitution were adopted. · There was no 
reason to believe·that this system would produce leaders who would re-
spect the rights of the people. Rulers, elected or otherwise, natural-
ly tended toward the aggrandizement of power. At the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention, Patrick Henry dismissed as an illusion the notion that the 
people remained the repository of power after turning it over to power-
ful officials: 
They say that every thing that is not given is retained. 
The reverse of the proposition is true by implication 
• • • • Implication, in England, has been a source of 
dissension. There has been a war of implication between 
the king and people. • The people insisted their 
rights were implied; the monarch denied the doctrine.27 
Anti-Federalists were appalled by the powerful President and 
Senate provided for in the Constitution, because this was so contradic-
tory to the Whig distrust of magistrates. Although the legislature 
itself was not above reproach, it nonetheless was the people's check on 
the abuses of the superior branches. It was from these that the great-
est danger of tyranny existed, not from the popular branch, as the 
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l''etleralists claimed. Richard Henry Lee found if violative of the 
"fundamental truth" of the concept of balanced government that "in the 
new constitution, the president and senate have all the executive and 
two-thirds of the legislative [powers]."28 These officials were seen 
as posing the greatest threat to the preservation of liberty; such un-
limited authority concentrated in this elite cadre provided the frame-
work for an aristocratic despotism. At the Virginia Convention, 
Patrick Henry declared that "Your president may easily become king." 
He found the Senate so constructed that a "very small minority,. may 
continue forever unchangeable this government. 1129 
Nor was Henry alone. Several other prominent residents of the Old 
Dominion thundered against the Federal Constitution with matching elo-
quence. George Mason, who served as a delegate to both the Federal 
Convention and the Virginia Ratifying Convention, wrote a brief but 
brilliant denunciation of the proposed Constitution entitled simply 
"Objections to the Federal Constitution." Edmund Randolph, who served 
as a delegate to the Federal Convention also, and was Secretary of 
state when Jay's Treaty was made, wrote a harsh letter denouncing the 
Federal Constitution. In general, both of these expressed a strong 
fear of the powerful President and Senate which the Constitution pro-
vided for. 30 
One aspect of the powers granted these offices which was partie-
ularly feared was the extensive treaty-making power they were given. 
This was seen as providing a blueprint for the usurpation of all the 
powers of government by the President and Senate. These aristocratic 
elements could manipulate the government to suit their personal ends 
under the guise of pursuing the national interest. "By declaring all 
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treaties supreme laws of the land," George Mason declared, "the execu-
tive and the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legis-
lation." Mason felt that this could have been avoided, however, "by 
proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent 
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of the House of Representatives, where it could be done with safety." 
Madison had expressed a similar desire for a legislative check on 
treaties at the Federal Convention, although he distinguished between 
different kinds of treaties. Madison suggested "allowing the President 
& Senate to make Treaties eventual and of alliance for limited terms 
and requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in other 
t . 32 Trea 1es." Later on at the Convention, he again expressed a strong 
desire to keep the President a limited official, especially in regard 
to making treaties. Presenting a motion to allow authorization of 
treaties of peace by the concurrence of the two-thirds of the Senate 
alone., Madison explained that "the President would necessarily derive 
so much power and importance from a state of war that he might be 
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tempted, if authorized, to impede a treaty of peace." Yet at the 
Virginia Convention, he attempted to refute Mason's charges by defend-
ing the placement of treaty-making powers in the Senate and President. 
To Madison, the Constitution did not leave the President with unlimited 
discretion in the power of making treaties, for "were the President to 
commit anything so atrocious, h ld b . h d 34 • e wou e 1mpeac e ." Through 
the power of impeachment, the House had an ultimate check on the treaty-
making power. 
Yet it was not just the power of the President and Senate to'make 
treaties that bothered the Anti-Federalists; it was the force which the 
treaties themselves held under the Constitution. To them the words in 
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the Constitution declaring that treaties would be the "supreme law of 
the land" meant that treaties would be placed above all other legal 
authority in the country, including the Constitution itself. A treaty 
could thus be used not only to usurp the power of the legislature by 
superseding its previous enactments but also to destroy the whole 
government as provided for in the Constitution. By allowing an inde-
pendent President and Senate to create treaties which knew no legal 
bounds, unthinkable horrors became imaginable. A delegate at the North 
Carolina Ratifying Convention expressed the fear that "by the power of 
making treaties, they might make a treaty engaging with a foreign power 
to adopt the Roman Catholic religionin the United States."35 
Madison thus felt pressed at the Virginia Convention to assert the 
propriety of establishing treaties as the supreme law of the land. He 
contended that unless this was so, they were meaningless. A treaty by 
nature must have the authority to supersede legislation which stood in 
its way. An ordinary legislative act which conflicted with the terms 
of a constitutionally-made treaty was therefore nullified, "for where 
i:here is a power for any practical purpose, it must supersede what may 
oppose it, or else it can be no power. 1136 In substantiating this point, 
Ila di son turned to an unexpected reference -- the English government. 
Quoting Blackstone's Commentaries, Madison cited the recognition of 
treaties made by the king as supreme law. This was claimed as proof 
that "if they are to have any efficacy, they must be the law of the 
. t 37 land: they are so ln every coun ry." 
Yet this did not mean that the treaty-making power was unlimited 
ln England or elsewhere. Reading further into Blackstone, Madison ob-
served that there was a check on this authority of the king which was 
vested in Parliament: 
And yet, lest this plentitude of authority should be 
abused to the detriment of the public, the constitution 
(as was hinted before) hath here interposed a check, by 
the means of parliamentary impeachment, for the punish-
ment of such ministers as from criminal motives advise 
or conclude any treaty which shall afterwards be judged 
to derogate from the honor and interest of the nation.38 
The obvious parallel Madison drew from this was that the power of im-
peachment vested in the House of Representatives provided a safeguard 
against the President and Senate from making treaties which violated 
th t 't t' 39 e Cons 1 u 1on. 
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The irony of using the king of England, from whose tyranny Ameri-
cans had revolted, as a precedent for establishing an Ameriqan chief 
executive was noted by Patrick Henry. Making reference to the compari-
son, Henry remarked "I will have no objection to this, if you make your 
'd t k' 1140 pres1 en a 1ng. To Henry, the President provided fnr in the 
Federal Constitution was even more absolute in his authority to make 
treaties than was the king of England •. The Anti-Federalist thought 
that a proper reading of Blackstone would "prove in a thousand in-
stances, that, if the king of England attempted to take away the rights 
of individuals, the law would stand against him."41 Yet no similar 
check could be found in the proposed Constitution. Saying that he had 
1 k d f h d h t h . h h d b . . 42 oo e or sue , Henry reporte t a 1s searc es a een 1n va1n. 
Nine years later, this unsolved dispute over the treaty-making 
power of the President and Senate and the role of the House in relation 
to them would explode over Jay's Treaty. The Republican opposition to 
Jay's Treaty revealed them as the successors of the Anti-Federalists. 
Indeed, the crux of their argument in claiming the r~ght of the House 
to subject treaties to its approval was the distrust of the President 
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and Senate which had characterized Anti-Federalist opposition to the 
Constitution. Behind this was the belief that the House was the guard-
ian of the people's liberties against the aristocratic upper branches 
of the government. An interesting addition to the Republican camp was 
James Madison, the man who had played such an instrumental role in the 
formation of the powerful federal government less than a decade earlier. 
Although he had previously viewed the people and their representatives 
as the greatest threat to the preservation of liberty, 43 Madison now saw 
the presidential office he helped create as posing that threat. 
The Federalists wasted no time in charging Madison with betraying 
his own principles. Madison's reply to this charge was that his 
principles were now being twisted by unscrupulous men and carried to ex-
tremes he had never advocated. He contended that he was remaining loyal 
to his earlier Federalist statements in the face of their distortion. 
This was partly true, in that Madison had suggested the possibility of 
a legislative check on the treaty-making power of the President at the 
Federal Convention. But when he stated during the debates over Jay's 
Treaty in Congress that he believed the force of ordinary legislation 
to be equal to that of treaties, Madison flatly contradicted his earlier 
contention at the Virginia Convention that treaties were to be regarded 
as the supreme law of the land. 
The battle over Jay's Treaty saw Alexander Hamilton arise as the 
ideological champion of Federalism. Hamilton remained true to the 
doctrine that the popular branch of government posed the greatest 
threat to liberty. The preservation of the republic depended upon 
shielding it from the frenzy of popular passions. The people, who did 
not always know what was in their best interest, needed the protection 
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of a strong President and Senate to reach decisions which would be in 
their true best interest. The uproar over a treaty the public did not 
properly understand would be used to the advantage of self-seeking 
representatives, unless the integrity of the upper branches of govern-
ment was respected. Tyranny of the mob was as destrustive, of repub-
lican government, or more so, than aristocracy. And at that moment, 
Hamilton regarded the former as presenting the clearer danger. The 
popular element of the government had to be stopped from exceeding its 
constitutional authority, or the republic was doomed. Thus Hamilton 
embarked on a serious effort to persuade Republican members of the 
House of Representatives not to interfere with the treaty-making power 
of the President. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF 
THE PRESIDENT AND SENATE 
Alexander Hamilton began discussion of the constitutionality of 
Jay's Treaty in a series of essays·under the name "Camillus" in 1795-
1796. Hamilton defended the treaty from every angle, but numbers 
thirty-six, thirty-seven, and thirty-eight spoke directly to constitu-
tionality. In number thirty-six, Hamilton stated the basis for claiming 
treaties were superior to ordinary legislation: (1) the relationship 
between the authorities and subjects in each; and (2) the binding force 
of each upon the contracting parties. As to the first of these, Hamil-
ton argued that the authority of legislation affected only the subjects 
within a nation, extending no further than that. Treaties, on the 
other hand, were compacts between sovereign nations as a whole. Acting 
in spheres outside ordinary law, treaty-power was therefore a separate 
and absolute authority. 
The means which the power of legislation employs are laws 
which it enjoys, the subject upon which it acts is the 
Nation of whom it is, the persons and property within the 
jurisdiction of that Nation. The means which the Power 
of Treaty employs, are contracts with other nations, who 
may or may not enter into them, the subject upon which it 
acts is the nations contracting and those persons and 
things of each to which the cqntract relates. Though a 
Treaty may effect what a law can,:yet a law cannot effect 
what a Treaty may.! 
Thus a treaty dealing with relations with a foreign power was be-
yond the scope of legislation. Once formed, a treaty was a solemn 
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agreement between nations. "The legislature may relate our own Trade 
but Treaty only can regulate the mutual Trade between our own and an-
2 
other country." Being a power separate from the authority of the 
legislature, it was naturally placed in a different branch of the 
government. 
This is proved in two ways lthat while the Constitution 
declares that all the legislative powers which it grants 
shall be vested in Congress, it vests the power of making 
Treaties in the President with the consent of the Senate 
2that the same article by which it is declared that the 
Executive Power shall be vested in a President and in 
which sundry executive powers are detailed, gives the Power 
to make Treaties to the President with the auxiliary agency 
of the Senate.3 
In reply to Hamilton, former Representative Alexander Dallas of 
Pennsylvania attacked the constitutionality of Jay's Treaty in an ex-
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position entitled Features of Mr. Jay's Treaty. In direct contrast to· 
Hamilton, Dallas claimed that "the legislative power is, ••• of su-
perior importance and rank to the treaty-making power." stating that 
a nation "may carry on its external commerce without the aid of the 
treaty-making power," Dallas thought a nation could not "manage its 
4 domestic concerns without the aid of the legislative power." He de-
clared bluntly that the "British Treaty and the Constitution are at war 
with each other,"5 because of the usurpation of the legislative powers 
of Congress by the President and Senate in Jay's Treaty. Dallas 
warned that if one branch of government was allowed to seize the 
authority of another, the result would be the "effectual subversion" 
of the Constitution. 6 
Besides mentioning the threat to Congress' power to regulate com-
merce, which formed the backbone of the Republican assaults upon Jay's 
Treaty in Congress, Dallas drew attention to several other points where 
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the treaty stood in a dubious relationship to the Constitution. Article 
18, which defined cargoes of American foodstuffs and naval stores bound 
for France as contraband and liable to British seizure, was condemned as 
a violation of Congress' power to define and punish piracies and felo-
nies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of na-
t . 7 1ons. 
In the most telling part of his essay, Dallas inquired whether the 
joint claims courts created by Jay's Treaty were in congruence with the 
constitutionally delegated authority of Congress to create tribunals 
inferior to the Supreme Court. If by treaty, the President and Senate 
could create such bodies in partnership with the British monarchy, 
would not the British perhaps someday be allowed to create, by treaty, 
tribunals of their own judges in America? What would prevent the 
President and Senate from engaging by treaty, into an alliance with 
Great Britain to wage war upon .France? If the other branches of govern-
ment were ever allowed to seize any of the legislative prerogatives of 
Congress through the power of treaties, what would prevent them from 
8 
eventually seizing all authority of Congress? This line of reasoning 
became, as will be seen, an essential element of the Republican argument 
against Jay's Treaty in Congress. 
In addition to foreshadowing the outline of the Republican attack 
on the treaty, Dallas' exposition suggested also the motivation of that 
resistance: "an indispensable duty to controvert and resist •••• 
this unqualified claim to onmipotence." 9 If this was not done, the 
Constitution would be destroyed, and thus the government of the United 
states "transformed through the medium of the treaty-making power, from 
bl . t 1' h 10 a repu 1c o an o 1garc y." Indeed, Alexander Dallas' Feature of 
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Mr. Jay's Treaty contained the body of the Republican opposition to 
Jay's Treaty as well as brilliant arguments of his own. 
The battle over Jay's Treaty in Congress occurred in two phases in 
March and April, 1796. The first of these was initiated March 7 by the 
introduction of Edward Livingston's resolution demanding the surrender 
of executive papers relative to the treaty to the House of Representa-
tives. In the second phase from April 13 to 30 Congress debated the 
issue of whether to appropriate funds to carry the treaty into effect. 
Essentially, the debate over Livingston's resolution centered around 
perceptions of the treaty-making power of the President, while the 
battle over appropriation involved the act of defining the power and 
nature of the House of Representatives. To be resolved in both was the 
form that republican governm~nt would take in America under the 'Federal 
Constitution. 
The debates in Congress over Jay's Treaty began on March 7, 1796, 
when Edward Livingston presented his resolution before Congress. De-
scribing the House as "the guardians of their country's rights," 
Livingston defined the motive behind his resolution as "a firm convic-
tion that the House were vested with a discretionary power of carrying 
th t . t ff t f . 't th . t' 11 e Trea y 1n o e ec , or re us1ng 1 e1r sane 1on." Going 
further, the Republican from New York suggested two firm constitutional 
grounds on which his proposal stood: (1) the superintending power 
which the House had over all officers of government; and (2) the right 
to give or refuse its sanction to the Treaty in those points where it 
12 interfered with the legislative power. These statements revealed the 
Anti-Federalist heritage of the Republican opposition to Jay's Treaty. 
The Republicans were hereby asserting that Anti-Federalist criticisms 
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should guide the government in interpreting the Constitution. The 
Anti-Federalists aversion to the authority of the President and Senate 
in making treaties was now claimed as being a condition the people had 
imposed when they gave their approval to the Federal Constitution. 
By the "superintending power which the House had over all officers 
13 
of Government," Livingston referred to the power of impeachment 
granted the House by Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution. Al-
though the resolution did not actually call for impeachment, it was im-
plied that such proceedings would perhaps become desirable after the 
papers were exposed to the House. Having seen the instructions to Jay 
while serving as chairman of a committee which inquired into cases of 
impressment, Livingston indicated that the discrepancy between those 
instructions and the terms of the treaty suggested a possibility of 
misconduct. Stating that "it evidently tended to the substitution of 
a foreign power, in lieu of the popular branch," Livingston regarded 
Jay's Treaty as replete "with the most serious evils."14 
The Federalists attacked what they sensed as an ambiguity in this 
part of the resolution. If the Republicans desired impeachment, they 
should have said so clearly. If the constitutionality of the treaty 
was suspect, then one should refer to the Constitution itself to clarify 
the issue. Such a comparison suggested no illegality to them. 15 Be-
sides presenting a danger to the Constitution by exceeding the delegated 
authority of the House of Representatives, Livingston's resolution also 
threatened the international position of the United States. If other 
nations could not negotiate in secrecy with our government, they would 
be most reluctant to do so. No nation would want to deal with a regime 
which exposed private papers to the public. Samuel Lyman of 
46 
Massachusetts claimed that this ''principle of the law of nations was no 
less than the law of self preservation," and the consequence of break-
ing it "would be pernicious and destructive."16 
If the Federalists adhered to Hamilton's remark at the Federal 
Convention that "no Government could give us tranquillity & happiness 
at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and strength to 
. 17 
make us respectable abroad," the Republicans seemed motivated by 
Madison's statement at the Virginia Convention that "if we be free and 
18 happy at home, we shall be respectable abroad." And the Republicans 
were currently anything but happy. 
Denying the dariger and illegality of summoning executive papers 
before the House, Republicans cited previous precedents for such ac-
tion: Secretary of State Jefferson's submission of communications to 
the British minister in 1793, the examination of the President's papers 
relating to the Neutrality Act of 1793, and most importantly, instruc-
tions to the minister who negotiated a treaty with certain Indian 
tribes in 1792. 19 The last incident was contended to provide 
the legal precedent whereby the President might obey the request. 
Stating that "the discretion of the House of Representatives as to com-
merce with foreign nations, stood precisely on the same footing with 
that which they ought to exercise in regulating intercourse with the 
Indian tribes," Livingston was of the opinion that "when the President 
recognized their right to deliberate in one case, he virtually did it 
20 in the other." 
The Federalists retorted that there was a difference between 
treaties with Indian tribes and with foreign nations, but the Republi-
cans dismissed the distinction, steadfastly insisting upon their right 
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to deliberate on the matter. Viewing themselves as the special guard-
ians of the people's liberties, Republican members of the House claimed 
that the people had intended for them to serve as such when the Con-
stitution was approved. William Lyman declared bluntly that "the House 
had the fullest right to the possession of any papers in the Executive 
department; they were constituted the special guardians of the people 
21 for that purpose." 
The Federalists consistently supported Hamilton's theory of the 
President as being as much a representative of the people as the Con-
gress. The people had declared their faith 1n this principle when they 
adopted the Constitution. Indeed, by declaring itself the sole reposi-
tory of the people's rights, the House actually infringed 'upon those 
rights by violating the will of the people embodied in the Constitution. 
Unlimited action on the part of the House would create, rather than 
prevent, despotism. In language similar to Jefferson's earlier comment 
on the Virginia legislature that "173 despots would surely be as oppres-
22 
sive as one," South Carolina Federalist Robert Goodloe Harper re-
marked: 
If the constitution was infringed, whether by the House 
or the other departments, the rights, the sovereignty 
of the people were equally trampled on, and it would be 
no consolation to them that it was done by one hundred 
and five men, rather than by thirty, or rather than by 
one. 23 
Asserted with equal zeal was the contention that the power of mak-
ing treaties resided in the President and Senate alone. The party which 
had been characterized previously by a broad interpretation of the 
powers of the federal government embodied in the Constitution was now 
putting forth a strict construction of the Constitution. Whereas the 
Federalists had earlier asserted that the Constitution implied broad 
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prerogatives of governmental authority, they now employed a literal 
interpretation of the Constitution to prove that the treaty-making 
power was the sole prerogative of the President with the check of the 
Senate. A direct reference to Article II, Section 2, revealed that 
the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
th t t k t . 24 e Sena e o rna e Trea 1es." There was no mention here in the Con-
stitution of the House having any agency in the creation and adoption 
of treaties, so how could the Republicans claim there was such? Isaac 
Smith felt that if the framers of the Constitution had "intended that 
House should have had an agency in the making of Treaties, they would 
' 25 have said so in express terms." He found nothing in the constitution 
that allowed the House of Representatives to check the passage of 
treaties. Massachusetts Federalist Theophilus Bradbury contended that 
the phrase "treaties made under the authority of the United states 
shall be the supreme law of the land,"26 meant that treaties made by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate were the law of 
the land. Therefore, Republicans, by claiming a right which the House 
of Representatives did not possess, were threatening the Constitution 
by attempting to exceed the delegated powers of the House. 
The Republicans did not believe they were exceeding their consti-
tutional authority, however. Albert Gallatin stated explicitly that 
the House had a right to see the papers because the treaty "operates on 
the objects specifically delegated to the Legislature." 27 Those objects 
were the power to regulate commerce granted to Congress by Article I, 
Section 8, of the Constitution. The Constitution would be violated if 
Congress were not allowed to exercise its proper authority. The Presi-
dent and Senate would be the ones destroying the Constitution by 
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exceeding thei.r delegated powers. Yet the J{epublicans feared more than 
just the actions of the President and Senate. 
This particular point of the controversy also involved the force 
of treaties themselves. What was the precise meaning of the words "all 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the 
28 United States, shall be the supreme law of the land?" To the Feder-
alists, "supreme law of the land" meant that treaties were superior to 
ordinary legislative acts. Madison himself had defended this doctrine 
eloquently at the Virginia Convention. 29 Now, however, the former 
Federalist spokesman qualified his earlier statements. Refusing to 
retreat from his earlier postulation that the power of treaties ex-
ceeded that of ordinary legislation, Madison.attacked the issue from 
the other side, declaring that in no way were treaties to be regarded 
as supreme over the Constitution itself. 30 This had not been contended 
by the Federalists in the battle over Jay's Treaty, yet it appeared to 
Madison that they irr.plied as much in seeking unchecked approval of a 
treaty which to him was constitutionally suspect. 
Choosing a middle ground, Madison attempted to show that the 
power of treaties and power of legislation were necessarily co-
operative. Although they might naturally conflict, each must be recon-
ciled with the other to preserve harmony and balance in the federal 
31 
system. Madison felt the Federalists were attempting to carry his 
earlier ideas to an extreme he had never advocated. As he viewed the 
crux of their position: 
It was to be decided whether the general power of making 
Treaties supersedes the powers of the House of Repre-
sentatives, ••• , so as to take to the Executive all 
deliberate will, and leave the House only an executive 
and ministerial instrumental agency.32 
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Conciliation be'tween the opposing branches would provide for the pres-
ervation of the Constitution. If the legislature conceded its power to 
regulate commerce to the President and Senate through the form of 
treaties, might not the latter use such articles to seize other legis-
lative powers? If the present claims of the supremacy of treaties we~e 
acknowledged, would this not allow the President through the agency of 
treaties to involve the country in foreign alliances and declarations 
of war? Obviously, something so repugnant to the Constitution had to 
be stopped. 
Other Republicans went beyond Madison's middle position that the 
legislative and treaty powers were co-equal. To them treaties were in-
ferior to acts of the legislature. Livingston contended that a literal 
interpretation of the Constitution proved this assumption. Quoting the 
exact words "the Constitution, the laws made in pursuance thereof, and 
treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land," Livingston concluded that. "the order in which 
this enumeration was made was descriptive of the relative authority of 
33 
each." 
Besides in the very words of the Constitution itself, Republicans 
found that the essence of the charter implied that the power of legis-
lation exceeded that of treaties. Republicans believed that if a con-
flict erupted between opposing branches of government, the popular 
branch must triumph to prevent a victory of despotism. "The reason why 
a law should repeal a treaty, is because the law is an expression of 
the will of the nation."34 Here again the old Anti-Federalist notion 
cropped up: the representatives of the people should serve as guard-
ians of liberty against the encroachments of the superior branches. 
Edward Livingston challenged his Federalist counterparts: 
Inquire whether there is more danger in trusting the 
Representatives of the people with a check on all 
Treaties relating to those objects which are specific-
ally vested in them by the Constitution, than in making 
those Representatives subservient to the will of 
twenty-one men~ who may be leagued with a foreign 
f'oW@f!~:!5 
The Federalists adhered to Madison's assertions of 1788 that a 
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treaty must in essence supersede the authority of ordinary legislative 
acts in order to have any real meaning. If treaties could not "touch 
the laws of the Legislature," these could hardly be formed, for "in the 
exercise of this power, it will unavoidably happen that the laws of the 
Legislature are sometimes infracted. 1136 But what assumptions did the 
Federalists have about the nature of treaties that led them to consider 
such articles as superior to legislative enactments? 
The source of this claim was the "Camillus" essays by Hamilton. 
In a near paraphrase of the New Yorker, Isaac Smith of New Hampshire 
declared that "treaties do what laws cannot do, but in order to do this, 
37 they must extend to some things which laws can regulate." Ezekiel 
Gilbert of New York made the Hamiltonian observation that "the acts of 
this organ of the will of the nation become obligatory upon the na-
.tion , so as to repeal any law of the Legislature repugnant to 
this sovereign will of the nation."38 Zephiniah Swift gave the most 
eloquent statement of the Hamiltonian position in Congress. Stressing 
the moral obligation of honoring the national faith, Swift contended 
that treaties created a situation whereby the national faith was pledged, 
and consequently it was "the absolute duty to ma~e the appropriations to 
carry it into effect." How could any honorable body of men claim that 
"after a debt or contract was entered into, that they should consider 
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the propriety of discharging the obligations?"39 
Treaties were thus depicted as sacred compacts which pledged the 
national faith. Federalists could point to chapter fifteen of the 
second book of Vattel's Law of Nations to show that treaties were a 
~ah~ed ~ot tiP Paith Between nations, the abro~~tion ot which C6rtstitut~d 
a violation of international law: 
The faith of treaties, that firm and sincere resolution, 
that invariable constancy in fulfilling engagements, of 
which declaration is made in a treaty, is then holy and 
sacred between the nations whose safety and repose it 
secures: ••• He who violates treaties, violates at the 
same time the law of nations.40 
Once a treaty was made, it was the obligation of Congress to enact 
legislation necessary to carry the treaty into effect. To refuse to do 
so would be tantamount to saying that the word of the United states was 
not trustworthy. Such action would be most injurious to the country, 
for what nation would want to enter into agreements with another which 
did not honor its word? This fear reflected the concern of Hamilton 
and the Federalists about the necessity of establishing international 
prestige for the fledgling American nation. If that respect were not 
d th h f . 1 f th bl' d d. 41 secure , e opes or surv1va or e young repu 1c seeme 1m. 
Republican opposition to Jay's Treaty at this critical juncture would 
naturally lead to a weakened international position for the United 
States. Indeed, from the perspective of the Federalists, the Republi-
cans threatened the very existence of the nation. 
The only instance in which the Federalists could concede the right 
to reject a treaty was when it was unconstitutional. In that case the 
treaty would by itself be void and therefore no longer binding upon the 
nation. Either a treaty was constitutional and therefore binding, or 
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unconstitutional and not obligatory. The House of Representatives had 
no role in determining the constitutionality of a treaty; its function 
was to act as a co-operative agent in the adoption of such agreements. 
Thus Jay's Treaty might be rejected if it were unconstitutional, 
but the Federalists did not believe it was. To the contrary, they con-
tended it was a valid compact formed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, containing no stipulations contrary to the 
Constitution. Therefore, it was the duty of Congress to carry Jay's 
Treaty into effect. However, most Republicans, Albert Gallatin in 
particular, did not see it this way. 
On March 24, Albert Gallatin delivered the most brilliant speech 
from the entire Republican delegation, perhaps the best speech given by 
either side during the course of the seven weeks when Jay's Treaty was 
debated. Gallatin eloquently defended all of the arguments Republicans 
gave for subjecting the treaty to House approval while simultaneously 
dismissing the contentions of the Federalists. Gallatin drew upon 
three sources to back his position: the law of nations, the precedent 
of the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution itself. Expand-
ing upon each, the Pennsylvanian argued convincingly that the legisla-
tive body had a right to exercise a check on treaties which dealt with 
matters in its power. If this right were denied, the separation of 
powers provided for in the Constitution would be destroyed. 
Gallatin opened his attack with an appeal to the Constitution, em-
ploying a curious combination of both strict and loose construction. 
In essence, he interpreted the powers of the President and Senate to be 
strictly defined and limited by the Constitution; while he viewed the 
power of the House of Representatives in a broad fashion. "The clauses 
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which vest certain specific legislative powers in Congress are positive, 
and indeed, far better defined than that which gives the power of mak-
ing Treaties to the President and Senate." "Nor," he declared "does 
the clause which declares laws and Treaties the supreme law of the land, 
. 4g decide in favo:tl bi' ~ither, and say which shall be paratnount.'' 
This latter st~tement was the foundation of Gallatin's argument. 
He insisted that the legislative power was equal to the treaty power, 
which the Federalists claimed to be superior. Knowing that he could 
not.persuade them with an appeal to the Constitution, Gallatin next 
turned to the law of nations, where he found it was the universal 
practice in limited governments that the legislature served as a check 
on the treaty-making power of the executive when the treaties it made 
would deal with matters which were ordinarily the prerogative of the 
43 legislative body. Quoting book IV, chapter 2, of Vattel's Law of 
Nations, Gallatin read the following passage: 
The Kings of England conclude Treaties of Peace and 
Alliance, but by these Treaties they cannot alienate 
any of the possessions of the Crown without the con-
sent of Parliament; neither can they, without the 
·concurrence of the same body, raise any money in the 
Kingdom. Therefore, when they negotiate any Treaty 
of subsidies, it is their constant rule to communi-
cate the Treaty to the Parliament, that they may be 
certain of its concurrence to make good such engage-
ments.44 
He next turned to the Articles of Confederation for a precedent in. 
claiming the right of the legislature to subject treaties to its ap-
proval. In this reference, the right of the old state legislatures to 
exercise such authority under the Articles was adduced as proof that 
this principle was firmly established in the American concept of govern-
ment. The Articles stated e~licitly that "The United States, in Con-
gress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of 
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determining on peace, of entering into Treaties and Alliances, provided 
that no Treaty of Commerce shall be made whereby the Legislative power 
of the respective states shall be restrained."45 
Gallatin referred to the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain as an 
example where the sovereignty of the state legislatures was recognized 
as superior to that of Congress when a treaty infringed upon the au-
thority of the legislature. Specifically, this involved the restric-
tion for British estates in America confiscated during the Revolutionary 
War. Reading from a letter to the British ~ommissioner written by John 
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay, Gallatin stated "as this is a 
matter evidently appertaining to the internal polity of the separate 
States, the Congress, by the nature of our Constitution, have no au-
thority to interfere with it. 1146 He contended that this was·"a full 
acknowledgement of the doctrine he was supporting, that the nature of 
the Constitution limited the Treaty making power although there was no 
express proviso to that effect. 1147 
Thus, while the Constitution did not explicitly state the right of 
the House to subject treaties to its approval, Gallatin regarded it im-
plied in the essence of the document, since this was such an essential 
principle of limited government. To refuse to recognize this right of 
the House would be to deny the will of the people, who had themselves 
framed the Constitution with this idea in mind. Gallatin found it a 
"truly novel doctrine in America, that those immediate Representatives 
were bound by the mandates of the Executive;" which if accepted "would 
destroy the liberties of the people of the United states."48 
If the President and Sena~e were allowed to seize the delegated 
authority of Congress to regulate commerce through a treaty, would it 
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not be long before the same two branches would in like fashion acquire 
the powers to declare war, raise and support armies, and raise money 
for such expenditures? Gallatin saw no reason to assume that such ex-
treme encroachments on the legislative authority of Congress by the 
~~es1derit artd Se~~t~ would not occur if the principle ~~ahtin~ sudh 
usurpation was ever acknowledged on any ground. The Federalist demands, 
if conceded to, would amount to the reduction of the House of Repre-
sentatives to a mere advisory body with no real authority. By so doing, 
the will of the people would be violated, and the stage set for a 
tyranny to emerge in the form of an unchecked executive operating in 
conspiracy with a small group of collaborators removed from the people. 
Gallatin was incensed at the idea that this was the desire of the 
people. He insisted that the American people riever intended "to invest 
an unlimited, and uncontrolled power over the purse and the sword in 
the President and Senate."49 
In concluding his argument, Gallatin stated precisely that what he 
was contending for was merely the right of ~he House to be an equal 
branch of the government. He was not suggesting that the legislative 
prerogative was superior to that of the other authorities established 
by the Constitution. Legislation was no more superior to treaties than 
treaties were to legislation. Thus when the two prerogatives clashed, 
some form of compromise must be worked out between the two opposing 
authorities to preserve the Constitution by retaining balance in the 
government. When a treaty contained provisions which regulated the 
commerce of the United States, that treaty must be submitted to Congress 
for its approval in order to uphold its authority to regulate commerce 
as explicitly defined in the Constitution. He did not feel that the 
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House had an expressed authority to check the passage of all treaties, 
but only those which dealt with the exclusive powers of the House. 
Gallatin conceded that in regard to treaties which did not trespass up-
on the prerogatives of the House "the power of the Executive remained 
t • I 50 en 1re. 1 
Apparently, Gallatin's words we:t'e agreeable to a majority of the 
House of Representatives. Following a few comments in rebuttal by 
several Federalists, a roll-call vote was taken on Livingston's resolu-
tion. It passed by the impressive margin of 61 to 38. 51 
The following day the resolution was presented to the President, 
and five days later, March 30, he sent a reply to Congress. In that 
message, Washington denied the request to furnish papers relevant to 
Jay's Treaty to Congress, seeing no moral or legal obligation to do so. 
He stated that he was withholding nothing necessary to determine the ad-
visability of the treaty and also stressed the necessity of secrecy in 
negotiations. Admitting that the one exception which would warrant 
such a surrender was impeachment, Washington noted such procedure was 
not called for in the resolution. The President defended the constitu-
tionality of his action by depicting himself as a qualified interpreter 
of the Constitution by virtue of having been present at the Convention 
which framed it. In his opinion, Jay's Treaty had been formed in ac-
cordance with the proper procedures for making treaties as outlined in 
the Constitution. To Washington, this meant the President acting with 
the advice and consent of the Senate exclusively. When his signature 
was affixed to the treaty, it became obligatory upon the nation. The 
Congress had no legal authority to subject the treaty to its scrutiny. 
To do so would violate the Constitution by exceeding its delegated 
58 
authority. Therefore, Washington felt obliged to conclude that "a just 
regard to the Constitution and to the duty of my office, under all cir-
cumstances of this case, forbids a compliance with your rcqucst." 52 
This prompted North Carolina Republican Thomas Blount to present 
a motion calling for a debate on Washington's message before the House 
of Representatives. He intended to show that the House sought no ex-
tension of its constitutionally delegated authority as the President 
claimed. Gallatin thought such a debate was necessary for the House 
to determine whether it would act further on the matter. Fearful of 
the consequences which would result from this, Federalists argued that 
the House had no legal recourse but to lay the issue to rest. However 
a majority of the Representatives did not see it that way, as Blount's 
motion was approved by a vote of 55 to 37. 53 
Federalist Aaron Kitchell responded to Blount's motion with a 
resolution which denied the right of the House to exercise authority 
in the ratification of treaties; upon it no action was taken. After a 
five day hiatus, another vote was taken on Blount's motion, which 
passed again by a margin of 57 to 36. Blount then presented a new 
resolution which stated: (1) that the House had the right to deliberate 
on the execution of a treaty which dealt with powers delegated to the 
body; and (2) that the House did not have to state its reasons for de-
manding the papers of the executive. 54 
On April 7, final votes were taken on both Livingston's and 
Blount's resolutions. The first passed by a margin of 54 to 37, while 
the latter cleared with a 57 to 35 vote of approva1. 55 
Although further demand for the surrender of papers was dropped, 
the contention of the House to subject Jay's Treaty to its approval 
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waH not. The votes on Livingston's and Blount's resolutions obviously 
r·evcalecl that a majority of' member•::; of' the House felt it was their con-
stitutional prerogative to exercise a legislative check on the passage 
of treaties. Thus the upcoming battle over appropriations would be a 
heated one. 
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CHAPTER V 
DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE !N A 
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 
On April 13, less than a week after Livingston's and Blount's 
resolutions were adopted by the House of Representatives, Jay's Treaty 
came up for debate over appropriation. Whether or not the House had 
the authority to intervene on the passage of certain treaties, the ex-
clusive power of Congress over money matters provided them with the 
opportunity to do so. If they did not agree appropriate money to 
carry Jay's Treaty into effect it would be rendered inoperable. With 
a majority of the House obviously of the opinion that it could scruti-
nize the treaty, the Federalists felt compelled to convince their 
colleagues of the moral obligation to grant appropriation. Thus the 
same notions of treaties as sacred compacts and the necessity of the 
cooperation of the House were stressed again, even though these argu-
ments had earlier failed to convince the Republicans. The Federalists 
relied heavily on a literal interpretation of the Constitution to con-
vince their opponents that they were legally and morally bound to grant 
the funds necessary to carry Jay's Treaty into effect. 
This provided the point of departure for the Republicans. To 
them, Jay's Treaty was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the 
power of the House of Representatives. Therefore they saw no moral or 
legal duty to carry it into effect, but rather the obligation to block 
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its passage. However, enough Republicans eventually became persuaded 
to change their minds to enable appropriation for Jay's Treaty to pass 
by a very small margin. Whether these defections were inspired by the 
eloquent oratory of Fisher Amers, as some have contended, or by the 
threat of Federalist rejection of Pinckney's Treaty with Spain, which 
the Republicans desired, these crossovers did not include any of the 
champions of the Republican position: Gallatin, Madison, Livingston, 
Blount, and others. The opposition leadership continued their strenu-
ous resistance to the administration. 
Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts initiated the conflict over 
appropriation by introducing the following resolution: 
Resolved, That provisions ought to be made by law for 
carrying into effect, with good faith, the Treaties 
lately concluded between the Dey and Regency of Algiers, 
the King of Great Britain, the King of Spain and certain 
Indian tribes Northw~st of the Ohio.l 
The wording of that resolution revealed the intentions of its Federalist 
author: to attempt to "sneak" passage of Jay's Treaty through Congress 
by tying it to other treaties which the majority of the House wished to 
see enacted. Presumably the desire to secure passage of the Spanish 
Treaty in particular would outweigh repugnance to Jay's Treaty. Sedg-
wick's ploy was quickly denounced by the Republicans. Gallatin rose to 
state that since the House had already declared its right to deliberate 
2 
on treaties, it followed that each was to be discussed separately. 
The next day Pennsylvanian Samuel Maclay presented a resolution 
countering Sedgwick's motion, which called for the withholding by the 
House of measures necessary for carrying the treaty with Great Britain 
into effect. Maclay found the treaty unacceptable on two grounds: (1) 
the inadequacy of the terms themselves; and (2) the infringement upon 
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the legislative authority of the House of Representatives by the Presi-
dent and Senate which the treaty embodied. Not only was it necessary 
for the House to protect its own existence but also to honor "those 
special duties in which they stood related to the people as their 
. 3 
Representatives." To Maclay, these duties included "to guard against 
the encroachments which might be made by the Executive on the rights of 
4 the people." Following this, Sedgwick's resolution was voted on and 
turned down, 55 to 37. To the Republicans' way of thinking, not only 
did the House have the right and duty as representatives of the people 
to subject Jay's Treaty to their scrutiny, but they also viewed the 
treaty as unconstitutional because it infringed upon the legislative 
authority of Congress. Therefore, there was no way they could approve 
the appropriation of funds to carry it into effect. To do so would 
constitute political suicide on the part of the House. And this of 
course would violate their specially entrusted responsibility as guard-
ians of the people's liberties. 
Outside the halls of Congress, newspapers carried on the spirited 
controversy. Containing a full account of the debates 1n the House the 
Federalist Gazette of the United States in Philadelphia ran a series of 
commentaries on the proceedings under the title "Communications." In 
these, the Republicans were attacked as "Jacobins" who sought to create 
anarchy in the United states by destroying the Constitution. Declaring 
that the President "has a sacred duty to discharge as well as the House 
of Representatives," the author of "Communications" asserted that the 
"treaty-making, or treaty power of the House of Representatives is not 
believed in even by the Jacobins." 5 Thus the Republicans were de-
nounced as hypocrites in claiming to uphold the will of the people in 
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defense of the Constitution. Besides knowing that they were actually 
violating the Constitution, Republicans were acting against the real 
desires of the people themselves. By the Constitution, it was asserted, 
the people had placed their trust in the President to make treaties. 
The Republican denial of this presented the threat that the "tree of 
liberty ••• is now in danger of being strip'd of its leaves, and of 
having its vital sap sucked out by the canker-worms." 6 
The Republican position was presented with equal vehemence in the 
Boston Gazette. In a series of letters entitled "From the Aurora -- To 
The People," the -claim was made in line with Alexander Dallas' essay 
that "it is easy to repel first usurpations; but nothing short of a 
revolution can restore a Constitution to its pristine purity, after it 
has been repeatedly assailed." Since Jay's Treaty could not become 
operative until money was appropriated by the House, and since it tres-
passed upon their delegated powers, Aurora hoped that "they can, and I 
trust will, declare it an unconstitutional act." 
The power to regulate commerce, to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization, and to define and punish piracy were all Congressional 
powers that were infringed upon by the President through Jay's Treaty. 
"The Aurora" presented the question as "whether the Constitution was 
made for the amusement and gratification of the Executive, or whether 
it was constituted for the security and happiness of the people."7 
Thus for the House to sit back and allow the President to seize its 
powers would not only destroy the Constitution but in so doing violate 
the sacred trust of the people. Could the House of Representatives, 
"consistently with the duty they owe themselves as well as their con-
stituents, surrender them into the hands of the executive?"8 
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This facet of the argument essentially amounted to a divergence of 
opinion over the role of the representative. Subscribing to the dele-
gate theory, Republicans felt their duty was to carry out the expressed 
desires of the people. Several representatives accordingly brought 
public petitions before the House which urged members of that body to 
block passage of Jay's Treaty. To the Republicans, their duty as the 
people's representatives mandated an exercise of legislative discretion 
on the despicable bargain. Virginian William Branch Giles, commenting 
on the vast numbers of petitions he had received on the subject, re-
marked that "from these petitions it will be found that the people had 
recognized the power of the House to interfere, and begged them not to 
abandon their rights." 9 
The Federalists, adhering to the trustee notion of representation, 
rejected this role of serving as a sounding board of the popular pas-
sions. Indeed, this was contrary to their basic philosophy of govern-
ment. The essence of the Federalist creed was that the people did not 
always know what was best for them. It was the duty of elected of-
ficials to act 1n the real interests of the people, and not merely echo 
the sentiments of the popular opinion. Judicious action on the part of 
responsible representatives was the only way effective popular govern-
ment could exist. If the capricious whims of the populace became the 
formulator of policy, tyranny of the mob, or anarchy, would result. 
The Federalists saw themselves as protecting the people's liberties by 
doing what was best for the people, whether they recognized it or not. 
The Federalists also rejected the notion that the House had a 
special role as the guardians of the people's liberties. To them, the 
President and Senate were intended to be guarantors of the rights of 
68 
the people as much or more than the House of Representatives. Isaac 
Smith of Now Hampshire suggested that the more frequent election of 
the members of the House provided for in the Constitution proved that 
the people were more suspicious of the representatives than of the 
. 10 
P~esident and Senate. Again making a literal reference to the Con-
sti tution, Federalists claimed that the people 1'had given power to the 
President and Senate to make Treaties, which if not complied with, would 
be to oppose their will."ll Thus the Federalists attempted to picture 
themselves as upholding the will of the people by respecting the bound-
aries which the Constitution had prescribed for the House of Repre-
sentatives. 
This line of reasoning was based on two assumptions: (1) that the 
people had an actual voice in the framing of the Constitution, and (2) 
that these same people actually regarded the President and Senate as 
the guarantors of their liberty. The Federalists resolved the first 
assumption by pointing out that the Constitution had been adopted by 
state ratifying conventions attended by elected delegates. This of 
course rested upon the assumption that these delegates acted according 
to the desires of the people who chose them. Once this notion was ac-
cepted, it was easy to uphold the second assumption: that the people 
regarded the President and Senate as guarantors of their liberties. 
The powers which the people supposedly granted to the executive and su-
perior house of Congress in the Constitution proved this to the Feder-
alists. Thus they charged the Republicans with violating this will and 
trust of the people by usurping the treaty-making power of the President 
given him by the people. 
The Republicans hardly viewed the President as much of a guardian 
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of the people's rights. They contended that neither did the people, no 
matter what the Federalists suggested the adoption of the Constitution 
meant. Madison read proposed amendments from the state ratifying con-
ventions of New York, Virginia, and North Carolina which suggested to 
him that the people intended for the House to have a check on the pas-
sage of treaties when the Constitution was adopted. Thus to the Re-
publicans, the people gave their assent to the Constitution with the 
understanding that such a limit on the power of the President would be 
established. Madison further contended that this had been his own 
conception of the treaty-making power of the President at the Federal 
Convention, thereby justifying his reluctance to recognize the neces-
sity of amendments at the Virginia Ratifying Convention. 12 
If the Federalists' conception of the Constitution prohibited t:Qem 
from acknowledging this, perhaps an appeal to another reference would 
make the point. As Madison had turned to the example of England at the 
Virginia Convention to show the efficacy of declaring treaties as the 
supreme law of the land, 13 Republicans now turned to the former mother 
country to assert the legal propriety for the legislature to subject 
treaties to its scrutiny. 
It might seem paradoxical that the opponents of Jay's Treaty, who 
criticized the do,cument by calling it a corrupt alliance with the de-
spised British monarchy, would turn to that very nation as providing a 
foundation for their argument. Yet this was done, with the inference 
that even as debased a government as Britain's provided such a check 
on the power of executive, thereby making their charge against the 
Federalists even more severe. The Federalists, in this view, were thus 
seen as perpetrating a tyranny even worse than that which existed in 
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Jo:ngland. Representative ,Tohn Page set forth the Republican view that 
the ·Federalist interpretation of the treaty-making power of the Presi-
dent assumed the American Chief Executive had even greater prerogative 
than the English king: 
If this be true, sir, we find that, although the British 
King, from whose tyranny we revolted, cannot force upon 
his subjects against the will of their Representatives, 
a Treaty, which, it is acknowledged, too, he has a right 
to make, the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES can, by his 
Proclamation, force upon the people who are his con-
stituents, a Treaty which their direct Representatives 
wish to suspend, alter, or annul.l4 
The severity of the Republican charge was revealed by their use of the 
word "even" in drawing parallels with the British example. Certain 
that "In all limited Governments, the Treaty power is subject to the 
limitations of the Constitution," Richard Brent asserted that "the 
practice of this principle may be found even in the British Govern-
15 
ment." Was it to be accepted, Gallatin asked, that "the House of 
Representatives of the United States ••• shall be ranked below the 
BritishHouse of Comtnons?"16 
The Republicans dismissed Blackstone's denial of the right of Par-
liament to subject treaties to their approval. Although Blackstone 
himself suggested that ultimate legislative check on this prerogative 
of the king lay in the authority of Parliament to impeach, 17 theRe-
publicans were not satisfied with this. Livingston found other legal 
treatises besides the Commentaries, which certified the right of Parlia-
18 
ment to subject treaties to their approval. Gallatin read from one 
of them, Anderson's History of Commerce, which described the annulment 
by Parliament of two articles of a commercial treaty with France in 
19 1665 which had caused considerable damage to the commerce of England. 
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Thus the Republicans invoked English precedent in support of their ar-
gument. 
The problem with this line of argument was that there was no 
single, coherent, written English constitution. The body of English 
law had evolved f~om a set of precedents and whibh by their very nature 
were often contradictory and incompatible. This unce~tainty of inter-
pretation should not have existed in America because of our written 
Constitution. Here the issue could be resolved'merely by turning to 
our sacred charter, which defined exactly the powers of each branch of 
government. The Republicans therefore invoked that section granting 
Congress the power of appropriating money to carry treaties into ef-
feet. What more proof was needed, they asked, of the authority of Con-
gress to subject treaties to its approval? It would be ridiculous to 
deny the legitimate exercise of power by one branch of government by at-
tempting to depict such as an usurpation of its delegated authority when 
that authority was provided for. As the Republicans saw it, the 
Federalists were attempting to usurp the power of the House by seeking 
to transfer its legislative functions to the President. Since this 
did not even occur in a system that had no clear barrier against it, 
how could anyone claim a legal ground for such action in a country 
., 
where a written charter prohibited it? James Holland of North:. Carolina 
noted the irony of the situation in his remark that "by giving~uncon-
trollable power to twenty Senators and the President, our government 
20 
will be in practice what the English Government is in theory." 
The Federalists were quick to react to this charge. Remarking up-
on the irony of the Republicans' use of Great Britain as a model, John 
Williams replied "though his colleagues presented Great Britain as 
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21 being in chains, yet he was drawing precedents from their Government." · 
At this point the Federalists began an elaborate discussion of the dif-
ferences between the British government and that of America under the 
Constitution. The two were described as differing fundamentally due to 
the nature of authority in each. In the British government, all power 
once resided in the king, who ruled his subjects in autocratic fashion. 
Parliament arose as the result of a desire to limit the king's absolute 
authority. Any liberties the people enjoyed had been wrested from the 
king as concessions. This in essence was the Whig interpretation of 
history -- the continual struggle between rulers and the ruled. 
But in America, things were different, according to the Federal-
ists. Here the government established under our written Constitution 
was an act of the people themselves. In the independent American na-
tion, a society existed where sovereignty actually resided in the 
people. According to the Federalist argument, these American people 
came together and formed their own government under the Federal Con-
stitution. Any power which this government had was granted by the 
people themselves. Any power not explicitly granted to the government 
by the people was therefore retained by the people. Consequently the 
American people had no reason to fear their elected officials as 
British citizens did their king. The President was a representative of 
the people, chosen by them, and subject to their removal. Vermont 
Federalist Daniel Buck stated it perfectly: 
The first principle of the American Government, is that 
nothing is surrendered, but all retained by the people; 
••• and it is agreed by everyone that the Constitution 
of the United States is the expression of the sovereign 
will of the people reduced to writing and now before us 
• our President stands as a subordinate officer or 
agent of the people.22 
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For this reason there was no need for Congress to resist the 
President as Parliament resisted the king. Owing to the difference ln 
the nature of power of the chief executives of each country, that of 
the legislative bodies was different also. Parliament stood in an ad-
ve~sary reiatioh~h1p to the king because of that body's struggle fo~ 
power against the magistrate. It was necessary for Pariiament to be 
arbitrary, for its very survival depended on such a position. And, 
because of this posture of Parliament, it possessed the tendency to be 
as tyrannical as the king himself. Always seeking to expand its power, 
Parliament knew no limits. Thus the British people, of whom only a 
tiny fraction were even represented in Parliament, were hereby crushed 
between the arbitrary pretensions of both king and Parliament, with no 
real safeguard of their liberty. 
In America, Congress enjoyed obvious rights and privileges which 
Parliament did not. For example, in Britain, "the Commons are called 
by the King, and ••• if refractory, ••• can be dissolved, 
Here the President cannot dissolve Congress. 1123 The American govern-
ment, founded by the people, consisted of representatives chosen by the 
people to carry out their will. Besides this essential difference, the 
Federalists argued that Parliament rarely opposed the king on treaties 
as the Republicans now suggested Congress should oppose the President. 
Uriah Tracy of Connecticut searched through the records and found no 
instance of Parliament denying approval to a tr~aty·made unconditionally 
since 1648. South Carolina Federalist Robert Goodloe Harper "chal-
lenged them to produce one (instance). in which Parliament has refused 
to execute a Treaty, their consent which was not made a condition in 
the treaty itself. 24 One treaty was rejected conditionally, the 
Treaty of Utrecht. The right of rejection was based on the treaty 
itself, not on the body of English law. 
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Federalists were apprehensive of their position to the closing of 
the debate. They felt something had to be done to persuade those who 
doubted the propriety of appropriation to change their minds. To that 
effect, Fisher Ames delivered an emotional speech on April 28 depicting 
the worst horrors imaginable if the treaty were not carried into ef-
fect. Ames opened his address with a plea for the members of Congress 
to appeal to their reason in guiding them in this decision, denouncing 
the popular passions which had gi vl:m rise to the wild accusations made 
against the treaty. The criticisms against the President and Senate 
were especially unfair, he thought. Where was it stated iri the Con-
stitution that the House of Representatives had a special authority 
above the other branches of government? The treaty-making power was 
vested solely in the President with the check of the Senate; the House 
was given no role in the process. A treaty, once made and ratified by 
the President and Senate, was a sacred compact binding the faith of the 
nation. The House could do nothing to make it valid or invalid. All 
they could do was either honor the pledge of the nation or break it. 
The latter course would be a violation of the law of nations, from 
which dire consequences could be expected. 
But was this treaty before the House so injurious to the national 
interest to render it void in itself? Ames concluded it was not. Nor 
were the majority of citizens opposed to its passage, as its critics 
claimed. These dissidents were dismissed as a noisy minority. The 
Massachusetts Federalist was of the opinion that some people in this 
country would denounce any treaty with Great Britain simply because it 
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was with Great Britain. And in relation to that nation being alluded to 
as a reference for the right of the legislature to intervene in the 
passage of treaties, he found almost no instance of it there for the 
entire previous century. 
Making a rousing appeal to patriotism, Ames glorified the building 
of national prestige by upholding the law of nations. Peace and pros-
perity would follow in the wake of approval. But if the treaty were 
rejected by a House exercising a prerogative which it did not legally 
possess, the ruin of the nation could be expected. Besides destroying 
our own republican institutions, such action would lead to strife 
abroad, resulting in loss of commerce and eventual conflict. The se-
curity of the nation, both within and without, was endangered by a re-
jection of Jay's Treaty. 25 With this, Ames laid his case to rest. 
Whether or not this was the determining factor in persuading some 
Republicans to vote for Jay's Treaty, a number did so when a resolution 
for carrying it into effect was presented the following day. Yet this 
was not a wholehearted endorsement of Jay·•s Treaty. Gabriel Christie 
of Maryland explained that "though he thought the Treaty a bad one, his 
constituents were desirous it should be carried into effect; and he 
found himself bound to lay aside his own opinion, and act according to 
their will. 1126 Even at that, the vote produced a deadlock, with 49 in 
27 favor and 49 opposed. 
The next and final day in the battle over Jay's Treaty, April 30, 
Massachusetts Republican Henry Dearborn attempted to break the tie by 
attaching a prefix to the resolution for carrying the treaty into ef-
fect which would allow those who were not really pleased with it to 
vote for it anyway. Specifically Dearborn's amendment stated that 
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although the treaty was "highly objectionable" on several points, the 
fact that the bulk of it would expire two years after the cessation of 
the present war would allow those not pleased to vote for it, since it 
could eventually be replaced by a 28 new agreement. 
But instead of bringing harmony, Dearborn's amendment brought only 
further discord to the House. The Federalists refused to concede that 
they were doing something wrong which they felt was right. After de-
bate, Dearborn's amendment was defeated by the bare margin of 50 to 49. 
Then the final vote was taken on the resolution "that it is expedient 
to make the necessary appropriations for carrying the Treaty with Great 
Britain into effect," which passed by the thin margin of 51 to 48. 29 
Thus Jay's Treaty became operative. But the division and ill-will 
which it had created in its passage were not to subside. Throughout 
the remainder of the decade, Federalists and Republicans would view 
each other as "anarchists" and "monarchists". ::rhis came largely from 
a belief by both that the other had sought the destruction of the Con-
stitution in their posture toward Jay's Treaty. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
By overlooking the Constitutional aspect of the battle over Jay's 
Treaty, most literature on this formative event in American political 
history has given an incomplete view of the ideological split between 
Federalists and Republicans. Republicans perceived Jay's Treaty as 
the transferral of the legislative authority of Congress to the Presi-
dent, which would lead to the establishment of tyranny as much as an 
alliance with Great Britain. On the other hand, the Federalists held 
the usurpation of executive powers by the House of Representatives as 
anarchical as an identification with revolutionary France. Thus, each 
side saw passage or rejection of Jay's Treaty leading to the immediate 
destruction of republicanism in America by destroying the Constitution. 
Previously, scholars have assumed that the Federalists viewed re-
jection of the treaty as the first step toward dissolution of the 
federal gove'rnment, while Republicans regarded its passage as opening 
the door to the creation of a monarchy in America. It is more correct 
to say that each side 1n the conflict saw either the passage or rejec-
tion of the treaty as actually destroying republicanism in America 
rather than merely leading to its destruction. An alignment with 
France would pave the way for "Jacobinism" in America; the usurping of 
the Constitutional authority of the President by the popular branch at 
the urgings of the "mob" would be its immediate triumph. Federalists 
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abhorred the public rallies against Jay's Treaty as the example of 
American Jacobinism. If popular passions could determine the fate of 
major policy, then the representative government established by the 
Constitution was rendered inoperable. Rule of the mob would be es-
tablished, and republicanism would vanish. On the other hand, Republi-
cans viewed an alignment with Britain as the inception of a monarchy in 
America; the seizure of the legislative functions of Congress by the 
President was its creation. If the Chief Executive could assume the 
prerogatives of the body which formed a check on his power, he would 
have the unlimited authority of a monarch. Tyranny would thus be es-
tablished in America at the demise of republicanism. 
The position of the Republican party in the 1790's does much in 
itself to indicate the importance of the Constitutional question to 
the anti-administration forces in particular. As Jefferson stated in 
a letter of April, 1796, "against us are the Executive, the Judiciary, 
two out of three branches of the Legislature."1 The House of Repre-
sentatives was the only branch of the federal government where the Re-
publicans enjoyed a majority. If they failed to assert the power of 
that body to check the policies of the Federalist administration, that 
party would be given virtual freedom to establish a model of the British 
system in the United States. The Republican party was the final bar-
rier against the creation of tyranny ln America. 
Republicans therefore acted out of more than a petty sense of 
partisan politics. While attempting to protect the Republican party, 
they were at the same time acting to save popular government in America. 
They saw the fate of republicanism as dependent upon the Republican 
party. This was due to their sincere belief that the Federalists were, 
J_n Jefferson's words, "an Anglican monarchical aristocratical party, 
... whose avowed object is to draw over us the.. substance, as they 
have already done the form, of the British government." 2 
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Federalists naturally held equally sinister views of Jefferson and 
his party. The supporters of Jay's Treaty both in and out of Congress 
made reference to their opponents as "Jacobins." Jefferson was thus 
seen as a demagogue who would stir up the popular frenzy, thereby lead-
ing a triumph of the mob over order. The survival of the federal re-
public therefore depended upon passage of Jay's Treaty. 
Both sides in this struggle thus doubted the patriotism of the 
other. Federalists and Republicans each believed that the other sought 
the destruction of the republic. This amounted essentially to a con-
tinuation of the old "conspiracy theory" that a group of malevolent 
conspirators existed which sought the destruction of the people's 
liberties. This accounted for the rigid polarization of the 1790's 
and the violent political atmosphere that accompanied it. Eventually, 
this served to hinder, rather than promote, the development of a viable 
two party system. The stagnation of the Adams' administration became 
a virtual paralysis of American democracy in 1798 over the situation 
created by the Alien and Sedition Acts. The battle over Jay's Treaty 
in 1796 set the stage for this occurrence. 
FOOTNOTES 
1The Life and Selected Writin s of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Adrienne 
Koch and William Peden New York: Random House, 1944 , p. 537. 
2Ibid., p. 532. 
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